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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the determination of the optimal tariff under the
assumption of Consistent Conjectural Variations (CCV). A general character-
ization of the CCV equilibrium is given. We show that (i) there are, in
general, a multiplicity of such equilibria, and (ii) under certain restric-
tions, the Cournot equilibrium, which is based on the assumption of no retal-
iation can also be a CCV equilibrium. By contrast, free trade is never a CCV
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Until recently, the theory of optimal tariffs has been based on the assump-
tion that neither country will retaliate to the imposition of the tariff by its
trading partner.!" The existence of tariff wars, however, calls into serious
question the realism of this assumption. This shortcoming is recognized in a
recent paper by Thursby and Jensen (1983), which analyzes the question of op-
timal tariffs on the assumption of some constant conjectured form of retalia-
tion by each country.V
In this paper, we determine the optimal tariff under the assumption of
consistent conjectural variations (CCV). That is, we assume that each coun-
try's conjecture about the retaliation by its trading partner is in fact con-
sistent with that country's reaction curve. This form of equilibrium is
appealing and has been introduced into oligopolistic models by a number of
authors; see, e.g., Laitner (1980), Bresnahan (1981), Perry (1982), Kamien and
Schwartz (1983), Eaton and Grossman (forthcoming). It has also been applied
to the determination of tariff equilibrium by Jensen and Thurshy (1984).
But despite its appeal and widespread adoption in the literature, the con-
jectural variations equilibrium is often criticized as not being a proper game—
theoretic construct. The essence of this objection is that in a static game
there is no possibility for action and policy reaction and hence there is no
way an agent can conjecture, let alone correctly conjecture, his rival's re-
sponse. One justification for the Consistent Conjectural Variations equilib-
rium in this circumstance is as a shorthand 'reduced form' for a fully dynamic
repeated game. Also, Bresnahan (1981) justifies it in terms of comparative
static responses in a situation where exogenous shocks occur with sufficient
frequency for each decision maker to observe and to learn his rival's true—2—
response. However, the dynamic process by which these consistent conlectures
are generated is an unsolved problem.-1
As we shall see in the course of the analysis below, the determination of
the CCV equilibrium involves inherent nonlinearities and all we are able to
establish is consistency to the first order of approximation. We give a gen-
eral characterization of the CCV equilibrium for the optimal tariffs. We show
that:(1)there are, in general, a multiplicity of such eciullibria, and
(ii) under certain restrictions, the Cournot equilibrium, which is based on
the assumption of no retaliation, can also he a CCV equilibrium. By contrast,
free trade is never a CCV equilibrium. Finally, we solve for the CCV equilib-
rium explicitly in a simple example.
2 DETERMINATION OF EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONSISTENT CONJECTURES
A. Framework
We consider the usual two country, two good trade model, where both coun-
tries are competitive and the only distortions are import tariffs.' We index
the countries by A, B, the goods by x, y, and assume without loss of gener-
ality that Country B imports good x in return for good y which it exports to
Country A. The tariffs levied by Countries A, B, are t, t, respectively,
and the two governments are assumed to redistribute the tariff revenues to
their citizens.
The basic model is described by the following set of equations:
U1 =U'(C',C1) I =A,B (1)
Ui
I —= p i =A,B (2)
Fi(Q,Q)
0 1A, B (3)—3—
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T1+t,t=l+T (9) y y x x
where C denotes consumption of good in Country iI =A,B, j= x,y
Q denotes production of good jinCountry i
E denotes excess demand of good jinCountry i
p =priceof x relative to y in Country A
q =priceof x relative to y in Country B
Equations (1) define the utility functions in Countries A, B to be func-
tions of the respective consumptions of the two goods. The functions U are
assumed to be continuous, twice differentiable, and quasi—concave. Equations
(2) define the optimality conditions for consumers in each country. Equations
(3) and (4) apply analogously to production. Equation (3) defines the
production possibility curve, which is assumed to be concave, while (4)
specifies the usual marginal product conditions for optimality. Equations (5)
define excess demand as the difference between consumption and production.
For the import good E > 0, while for the export good E < 0.'
Equations (6) describe the balance of trade equilibrium for the two coun-
tries, while (7) specifies market clearance in the world markets for the two—4—
goods. With no transport costs and in the absence of frictions, (8) specifies
the relationship between the relative prices of the two goods in the two
economies and the tariffs being levied. Using this relationship, it is clear
from (6), (7) that the goods markets are not both independent; equilibrium in
one implies equilibrium in the other, so that one equation, say (7b), can be
dropped.
B. Determination of Optimal Tariff with Conle.ctured Variations
Consider first Country A. Using (5), (6), (7b), its utility function may
he expressed in the form
UAuA[QA_E13,QA+qEBIT}
To determine the optimal tariff, differentiate TJ with respect to 1. Taking






EB 1 —l dr *
+ + EB I--- + Iq(i_)- EBI = o (10) XIT It Txlidr B
JxLy xx jjy
where(dr/dr)Bdenotes the conjectured variation of Country B in response to
thetariff imposed by Country A. Performing the same calculations for Country
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where (dTy/dTx)A is the conjectured variation of Country A in response to the
tariff imposed by Country B.
Define the following elasticities of the offer curves
EA EB
c B P P EA q p EB
y x
A B (Ii) E T E T
< 0; B—i— <0 y T A x r B yE xE
y x
The sign restrictions introduced are based on the assumption that an increase
in the relative price of good x in either country reduces the excess demand
for that good, while increasing it for the other good y. As usual, we invoke
the Marshall-Lrner conditimi C > 1. Also, an increase IL the tariff
p ci
rate reduces the excess demand for the imported good. Using these definitions


















Differentiating the basic model with respect to T, t, one can express the par-
tial price derivatives in terms of the elasticities as follows:—6—
— +ilI +
= Iq
'— Ia_ =.a.I X q
TTI— i1' TtIaB—1
yYLP q jX Xp ci
(13)
I— I+—1




Notethat in the case that no retaliation is anticipated (the Cournot case),
dT* dt*
=—' = 0 'dT /
XA
and (12), (12') reduce to
— —1 — 1
tx_cL —l
q p
which are just the usual formulae for the optimal tariff.'
C. Determination of Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium
Substituting for i =x,y, into (12), (12'), these condi-









-TJ+ (cLpcLy)T[q(T_l) 1}() =0(14')
dT*
cit*
To this point, the conjectured variations (1) ,arearbitrarily
XA
specified.We nowimpose the condition of consistency of these conjectures by
equatingthem to the slopes of the actual reaction functions. For notational
convenience, let—7—
,T )(c—c* )T{(t —l)3 ÷ T ] (15a) yxpyx y q y
QA(TT)(8q+8x)Ty[(Ty_l)c&p
+11 (15b)
rBer,T )(8 -ff3)T[(T —l)c —TI (15c) y xq xy x p x
(py)Tx[(tx_l)8q —11 (15d)
and denote the slopes of the reaction functions by
dr d-r
A. • A (X
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÷ QB(r ,T)A =0 (16b)
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These equations jointly determine the optimal tariffs t,t, aswell as the
slopes of the reaction curves A' B Because of the nonlinearity, these
solutions need not be unique. There may be a multiplicity of solutions;
alternatively there may he no real solution to these equations, in which case
8/ there is no CCV solution.—
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF CCV EQUILIBRIUM
-
Equations(16) give general characterizations of the CCV equilibrium. The
following propositions can be established and are proved in the Appendix.—8—
Proposition1: A Cournot equilibrium is CCV if and only if
the elasticity of each country's offer curve is independent
9/ of the other country s tariff.—
In their analysis of conjectural variation, Thursby and Jensen (1983) have
shown that under certain conditions, free trade may emerge as a special case
of their conjectured tariff equilibrium. By contrast, we can show:.!.-"
Proposition 2: Free trade is never a CCV equilibrium.
4. CONSTANT ELASTICITY OFFER CURVES
The expressions for the optimal tariffs under CCV, embodied in (15), (16)
are extremely complicated to determine. In this section we consider the case
where all elasticities 8q' 8, c, ,areconstant. Eliminating cA, B' under
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Equation(17a) defines the reaction curve for Country A, correctly taking
account of the reaction function of Country B. Likewise, (17b) does the sane
for Country B. The pair of equations may therefore he termed as being "gen—
eralized" reaction functions. Because of the interactions they embody, both
of these equatioiis are highly nonlinear, raising the possibility of a multi-
plicity of solutions. Note that
(r —1)8 +T =0,(t —l)cc —T=0
y q y x p x—9—
satisfy the two equations. This verifies Proposition 2, that with offer
curves having constant elasticities, the Cournot solution is also a CCV solu—
tion. But there are other solutions as well.
In order to study (l7a), (17b) further, and to obtain an explicit solution,
we shall consider the case where not only all elasticities are constant, but
also both countries are symmetric with
a =—f3 a, a =
p q y x
Given the symmetry it is clear that the solutions to ,T,obtained at the
intersection of the reaction functions (17a), (17b) must imply t=T,afact
which can be verified directly. Thus setting T = = Tin (l7a) say and
simplifying the common CCV tariffs are obtained as the solutions to the equa-
tion
[(l-a)r- — 2ctt—(1-)]=0 (18)
Letting r =l+T,the solutions to this cubic equation are
* 1 (i) t =t1
=
—
*I (ii) t =t2
=—
/a
*—l (iii) t =t3
=—
/a
Thus, in general, there are three CCV equilibria, one of which is t =t,the
usual Cournot equilibrium.
These solutions may be ranked over varying values of the elasticity a.
First, in order for the Marshall—Lerner condition to hold a > 1/2. Secondly,
for the range 1/2 < a < 1, both t (Cournot) and t3 imply corresponding values
T, t3 < 0. That is, the price of the imported good in each country is negative,—10—
which is obviously infeasible. Hence, for 1/2 < a < 1 there is a unique
feasible CCV solution, namely
* 1 = = —:
For a > 1, all three solutions are feasible, although t3representsa
subsidy. If 1 < a < a*, where ct =2.618is the positive solution to the
equation
2— +1=0




Onthe other hand, if a > a* > 1, the rankings are altered to
t>t>t.
5.CONCLUSIONS
This paper has determined the optimal tariff under the assumption that
each country correctly anticipates the response by its rival. We have given
both a general characterization of this CCV equilibrium and considered a
specific example. In general, there are a multiplicity of CCV equilibrium
tariffs. Under certain restrictions one of these may be the Cournot equilib-
rium, which (in this case correctly) assumes no retaliation. But free trade
is never such an equilibrium outcome.—11--
FOOTNOTES
*1 am grateful to two referees for their comments and to Tamer Basar for
helpful discussions on the game—theoretic underpinnings of the Consistent
Conjectural Variations equilibrium.
1See, e.g., Johnson (1954), Gorman (1958), Horwell(1966), and more re-
cently Otani (1980). Some of the literature is summarized in a survey article
by McMil!an (1985).
VAlternative tariffstrategies are considered by Mayer (1981), Riezman
(1982).
i"The notion of consistentconjectural variations equilibrium has been.
refined recently by Basar (1986) who defines CCV equilibria of different
orders. He shows that when appropriately defined, the CCV can indeed he a
legitimate equilibrium concept. According to this classification, the Cournot
equilibrium is a zero'th order CCV equilibrium. The usual definition, and the
one we shall consider here, is a first order CCV equilibrium, in which the
players correctly conjecture on the slopes (first derivatives) of the reaction
functions. More generally in a CCV equilibrium of the n'th order, the rivals
correctly conjecture on the first n derivatives of the rival's reaction func-
tion.
model we employ is a standard trade model such as in Bhagwati and
Srinlvasan (1983) or Takayama (1974).
-'Under ourassumptions, EA > 0, EB > o.
y x
1See, e.g., Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983)or Takayama (1974).
.Z.1'Details of this derivationare available from the author on request.
'Prob1ems of nonexistencecan arise when the two countries are too
dissimilar.
similar proposition has been obtained by Jensen and Thursby (1984).
10/—Thatis, in the Thursby—Jensen model free trade may emerge as a nonco-
operative equilibrium. This is not so under our CCV assumptions. By con-
trast, in the Eaton and Grossman (1983) duopoly model, with no home consump-
tion, free trade emerges as the CCV equilibrium. Mayer (1981) and Riezman
(1982) show how free trade may result from a cooperative equilibrium.—12—
APPENDIX
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1
Assuming a Cournot equilibrium and setting A == 0in (16a), (16b) of
the text, these equations reduce to
=rB(r,T)=0.
Noting the definitions in (l5a), (15b) of the text, these conditions can be
expressed in terms of elasticities, as
(t—1)8+T=0
y q y
(r —l)c —r =0 x p x
The equilibrium will be consistent with CCV (with zero conjectured variation)




Since 8 =8(cj,r ),wehave
q q x
=_a i— +—a
citq atat x x x





An analogous condition holds for dc /dr =0.
p y—13—
Proof of Proposition 2
To establish this proposition suppose that free trade were consistent with
CCV. In this case t =T=1(i.e., t =t=0)are solutions to (16a)—(16d).
Setting T =t=1in the definitions in (15) we have
p y q x
rB =qx
=




Multiplying these two equations together yields
=1 (A.2)
Differentiating the expressions in (15) with respect to T,T, andeval-
uatingat the free trade equilibrium t == 1,yields
A aci ac& A act act
=(P - —) +(ci —a )(5 +1); =—2-—1 + - at at at p y q at at a
A 8 as A as as
=__a + + (5 +5 )(1-fa); ----= —. +
att at q x p Dtrat y y y x x x
= + —(B+B); = + +
Bci cz B act act
— i. = —(—---2-—— +ct —ci )(5 —l at 'at at ''at 'at at /' py q y y y x x x
Next,substituting these quantities into (16c) and (16d) and using (A.2), we
obtain—14—
Dctct
+ + + (.E — +
+ [E _1 + (ap_y)(1+q)]
0 (A.lc)
— (..2 — Z) — (apZy)(l•••q) — + —
ac c& + [_( ++ xqp_1)] B -- = 0 (A.ld)
Finally,summing these equations and substituting for (A.la), (A.lb), these
equations reduce to
(÷B —a+a)(B —a+1)=0 (A.3)
q x p y q p
But this is a contradiction. By the Marshall—Lerner condition a —B—1> 0,
p q
while the condition
B+B —a +a =0
q x p y
contradicts the sign restrictions imposed in (11) of the text. Thus we con-
clude that free trade is never a CCV equilibrium.—15—
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